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ABSTRACT
My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important 
notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what 
I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I 
first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept 
ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect 
directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is 
used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and 
concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, 
sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique 
repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representa-
tions (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to 
show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a con-
ceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically 
and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large 
part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens 
makes itself what it is.
Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire. 
RESUMO 
Meu objetivo neste texto programático é explorar algumas relações entre as noções de 
intencionalidade, disposição e artefato. Não haveria artefatos sem “trabalho intencional”, 
uma atividade sustentada para a produção de algum bem útil ou de valor. Apresento em 
primeiro lugar o contextualismo como método usado para delimitar melhor o conceito 
ARTEFATO, com a intenção de aplicar o mesmo conceito aos nossos repertórios de dispo-
sições mentais, particularmente aqueles que afetam diretamente nossa identidade pessoal. 
O critério da intervenção humana, por mais impreciso que seja, é inevitável. As atitudes são 
estados mentais com conteúdo conceitual, e conceitos são disposições. Adquirimos con-
ceitos durante a vida toda, às vezes inconscientemente e sem querer, às vezes através de 
algum tipo de definição, e cada agente cognitivo possui um único repertório de conceitos 
e um idioleto que lhe é próprio. A ideia de que nossas representações mentais (ou algumas 
delas) são artefatos pode parecer estranha à primeira vista, mas tentarei mostrar que ela é 
plenamente sensata. A maioria de nossas disposições mentais – aquelas providas de con-
teúdo conceitual – são elas mesmas artefatos. Finalmente, a razão pela qual somos todos 
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Applied Concepts
The contextualist treatment of meaning is well-known. 
The semantics of natural languages must answer to prag-
matics. The powerful idea of truth-condition is preserved as 
a pragmatic notion. There is no such thing as a null context 
in which words and sentences would have their “pure liter-
al meaning”; an asserted declarative sentence determines its 
truth-conditions always and only against a background of as-
sumptions. These assumptions must be “weakly act ivated” for 
a correct understanding. By that I mean that they are remote-
ly related to the content of an assertion, but their relevance is 
so weak that they do not even come to mind. They are not 
the focus of our attention when we hear a sentence, but they 
are part of the whole information our understanding must 
consider. A change in the background usually means a change 
in conditions of satisfact ion.2 A contrast  in the background 
of two contexts of use, most of the time, entails difference in 
meaning (truth-conditions). Words have a nucleus of sense, 
but it is general in charact er and get through pre-proposition-
al pragmatic processes prior to any application of the compo-
sitional rules (Recanati, 2004, 2010). Like a handshake, the 
meaning of words can have many different meanings deter-
mined by contextual factors. Between two unknown people, 
it is a way to salute each other, a sign of good will or openness 
for collaboration. This could be the nucleus of sense of the 
act of shaking someone’s hand. But between two people that 
just had a fight, it is also a sign of reconciliation; between two 
old enemies, it means the end of something like a personal 
war; between two very good friends, it could mean the cool-
ing down of the relation (why not big hugs as usual?). When 
Marshal Pétain shook Adolf Hitler’s hand, it was understood 
as a sign of submission and shame for the French nation. 
When Nixon and Zhou Enlai shook hands in 1972, it meant 
that two great nations will finally have normal diplomatic re-
lations, etc. It is not much different with words and sentences. 
The word “walk” will be understood correctly if understood 
differently in different tokens of the sentence-type “Aisha had 
a walk.” In a context where Aisha is a toddler, we understand 
that she just gave her first steps in her whole life; if she is a 
healthy adult, we understand that she walked a few kilome-
ters to stay in shape; if she is an athlete that undergone a knee 
surgery, we understand that she will be back soon to her team; 
if she is an elderly person in a hospital, that she walked in the 
hallway for a few minutes, etc.3
I suggest that something very similar happens when we 
apply concepts, even when they are not the content of words. 
There can be concepts with no associated words (you can 
have the ability to (re-)identify a sp ecific shade of blue for 
which you lack a word.) We apply concepts to identify and 
classify things. It is an ability, an acquired capacity. Capacity 
and ability are, of course, dispositions. I take applied concepts 
to be the manifest ations of dispositions acquired in different 
ways over time and somehow realized in the brain; they are 
not functions grasp ed in a mysterious way, but set-theoretical 
notions can be used to describe their manifest ations. They 
have normative conditions of application, but their extension 
can change according to the context. The extension can also 
change according to the time of the tokening or manifest a-
tion, and the possible world. It happens frequently that some-
thing that is not really C falls under C. A plastic lemon is not 
a lemon, but in a context where there is no other real lemon, 
if someone ask you to pick up the lemon, you will correctly 
count the plastic thing as a lemon. The extension of a concept 
is not something given once and for all. In the backyard of 
your house, there is a rock with the appropriate form that can 
serve as a bench or garden chair. It will count as a chair insofar 
as it satisfies your desires, needs or plans. 
Concepts and word meanings are relatively stable for 
the sake of communication, but they are submitted to our 
conative mental states. By that I mean that they can be slight-
ly “bent” according to our expectations. Standing meanings 
correspond to what Austin called “descriptive conventions” 
(Austin, 1979, p. 121-122). Standing meanings are always 
general in charact er. But we always talk in highly sp ecific 
contexts where meanings are applied to particular concrete 
objects (events, facts, etc.). Of course, the situation is totally 
different with the regimented languages of science. In a reg-
imented language, all tokens of the same sentence-type de-
termine the very same truth-conditions to secure a common 
understanding for the members of the same scientific com-
munity. In science, meanings and concepts have no plasticity. 
But in ordinary language, different tokens of the same sen-
diferentes psicologicamente e culturalmente, é que nossos repertórios de conceitos e nossos idioletos são diferentes. 
Por uma grande parte, o que torna nossa espécie tão especial, é este incessante processo através do qual homo sapiens
faz dele mesmo o que ele é. 
Palavras-Chave: Intencionalidade, disposição, artefato, contextualismo, repertório.
2 The idea of condition of satisfaction is a generalization of the idea of truth-conditions for assertions. An assertion is satisfied if and only 
if it is true; an order is satisfied if and only if it is obeyed; a promise is satisfied if and only if it is carried out, etc.
3 This is a variation on an example given by Julius Moravcsik, in Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind. 
See Moravcsik, 1998, p. 30.
André Leclerc
42Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):40-47, jan/apr 2021 
tence-type must be understood differently (according to the 
context) to be understood correctly.  
There is an asp ect of meanings that I would like to high-
light: they are instructions to construct schematic mental rep-
resentations. I know it sounds like psychologism, but I believe 
that without imagination and imagery, language use would be 
a total mystery. The act of grasping the meaning of an arith-
metic sentence is certainly not part of the meaning itself. But 
even the most radical anti-psychologist would admit that there 
wouldn’t be any grasping or understanding at all without some 
mental act ivity. In other words, the grasping itself is psycholog-
ical, “subjective elements are a necessary part and parcel of ... 
[the] grasping” (Frege, 1979, p. 4).4 Otherwise, how could there 
be thoughts or conceptual contents in our mind? Do they get 
in without knocking at the door? With no invitation? Now 
suppose someone screams “Let’s storm the Bastille!” Those who 
heard that war cry knew what to do, they were guided, so to 
sp eak, by the sentence. How? The answer I want to propose 
appealed, once more, to dispositions:  when we learn to use 
words, corresponding dispositions are created. Dispositions do 
not work in isolation. In auspicious circumstances, the hearing 
(or seeing) of a word could be enough to cause the manifest a-
tion of some associated dispositions for discourse recognition 
(oral and written), and the manifest ation of a disposition for 
semantic content (or the associated concept) in connection 
with other contents; and this very fast process usually (but not 
necessarily) involves schematic mental representations. The 
set of all such linguistic dispositions constitutes a repertoire 
called “idiolect.” Such representations are necessarily schematic 
because they are general in some degree and can be applied in 
different contexts, so that they must exclude, therefore, irrele-
vant details. When a teacher says to his students: “Don’t think 
of an elephant!”, the result is unavoidable: they all represent a 
large animal with a trunk and big floppy ears. Not a particular 
elephant. Any elephant would do (Lakoff, 2004, p. 3).5   
Human Intervention
There are distinctions important for us that cannot be 
made easily in a principled way. For instance, we can normally 
distinguish between what we do and what happens to us. But 
it is very hard to say exactly how we do it. Carl Ginet talks 
about an “act ish phenomenal quality” (Ginet, 1990, p. 11 et 
passim) that we feel when we act voluntarily and that is not 
present when we stumble. But when the eye doctor puts a 
drop of collyrium in my eye and says, “Try not to close your 
eye!”, I can’t help but closing it...  If it makes sense to try, it 
should be within my power not to close it. But I close it. Is it 
really something I do? 6
When it comes to the distinction between artefacts and 
things-found-in-nature, we find ourselves in the same predic-
ament. There are two parameters to be considered here: on 
the one hand, raw (natural) material, and on the other, some 
degree of human intervention. The proportion changes ac-
cording to the case. Most of the time, trees and flowers are 
found “untouched” in nature, in forest or countryside.  But 
what about planted trees in the king’s garden? Are they ar-
tefacts? Since the Renaissance, gardening is seen as a sublime 
form of art. Pract ices like crossbreeding are very ancient. 
Like any living organism, ewes come from a long evolution-
ary (natural) process. The ewe Dolly is a clone and would not 
exist without human engineering. All the genetic heritage 
used for the cloning came from a natural process. Is Dolly an 
artefact? It would be easy to add other examples. They show 
how hard it is to delimit exactly the extent to which human 
intervention must be allowed in order to count something as 
an artefact. Every little thing we produce intentionally: ham-
mer, watch, chair, pencil, you name it, requires raw material, 
but we all consider them artefacts. I am pretty sure that most 
people would say that domesticated animals are not artefacts. 
To put a necktie on a pet cat does not change his nature.  
We can distribute along the same line different artefacts 
according to the degree of human intervention: at one ex-
tremity, say the left side of the line, we have cultural objects 
like institutions and fictional charact ers, that is, abstract ar-
tefacts where human intervention is almost everything. The 
fabrication of silex axes represents quite a lot of work. Then 
we have, in between, artefacts of first generation (wheels, 
houses, tables, some tools, cars, mechanical devices, etc.) and 
artefacts like robots, designed to make other artefacts (cars, 
for instance). Many artefacts today are made by robots or 
some mechanical devices.  At the other extremity of the line 
(on the right side), we have things like readymade works of 
art. A walking stick found in the wood falls in the same cate-
gory; a cave can be a shelter for many families, etc. Here, hu-
man intervention is almost nothing. 
The identity of a fictional charact er does not depend on 
anything material even though, of course, it could not exist 
without a material base (flesh and blood actors, token-books, 
token-films, DVDs, etc.). An institution cannot be identified 
with its material base (a building, and people working in it). 
In the same way, an institution needs a material base to ful-
fill its proper function. Perhaps, the most famous example of 
a readymade work of art is Marcel Duchamp’s bottle rack 
(1914): just pick up a bottle rack, put it on a pedest al, and call 
it the Bottle Rack. Well, any bottle rack is already an artefact, 
but readymade works of art, most of the time, are taken di-
rectly from natural environment. You go for a walk by the sea 
and find an old stump on the beach brought by the tide. It has 
4 “Even if subjective elements are a necessary part and parcel of ... [the] grasping of a content, we shall not include them in what we call 
‘truth’” (Frege, 1979, p. 4).
5 Lakoff calls “frames” these schematic mental images.
6 See Ruth Millikan (2004, p. 3), for that example.
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an interesting form that looks like the Nefertiti bust you have 
seen in Berlin; you call it Titi and bring it home. Perhaps, a 
few chisel strokes are necessary to underline the resemblance. 
It now has a place in your living room. A lock of hair can be-
come a fetish; it once belonged to a beloved person, help you 
to remember her and you believe it brings you luck. In the 
middle of the line we would find most manufactured objects 
made by transforming raw material in something that satisfy 
our desires and needs. 
Any artefact presupposes some mental states, acts, 
events, needs, attitude or stance. The Nefertiti’s head is in the 
eye of the beholder and depends on an attitude, intellectual 
or emotional. The attitudes and act ivities of the sculptor who 
made the original bust seen in Berlin are very different and 
quite complex. An institution like the Supreme Court exists 
because of the thoughts and hopes of people working in a 
constituent assembly. The art of storytelling and the creation 
of charact ers would be impossible without mental imagery. 
Nowadays, we create artefacts (machines, robots) that pro-
duce other artefacts (hammers, pencils, knives, cars, etc.). But 
the machines or robots are, of course, created with certain 
purposes. 
Summing up: artefacts would not exist without human 
intentional intervention. Trees, and flowers are not artefacts, 
but gardens are, when contrasted with what we find in forests 
and countryside. The case of human manipulation of the ge-
netic pool of a sp ecies is not crystal clear. Dolly would not ex-
ist without human intervention. I think we hesitate to count 
Dolly as an artefact because she has, after all, a certain auton-
omy, like pets and domesticated animals. Her behavior does 
not depend on some artificial programming. It is indiscern-
ible from the behavior of any other ewe.  She is not a robot. 
When the contrast is between Dolly and any other “naturally 
born” ewe, we are inclined to classify Dolly as an artefact; but 
if the contrast is between Dolly and common or typical prod-
ucts of human engineering, the tendency is just the opposite. 
Formal and Natural Languages
Formal languages are clearly artefacts. They are shar-
able entities created by one person or a small group, with a 
rigorously sp ecified structure, and generated by the rules of 
a grammar that do not allow for exceptions. The syntax in-
troduces the semantics, and the semantic properties of any 
sentence-type are inherited by all its tokens. Things change 
with indexicals and demonstratives (tokens of “I am thirsty” 
may have different contents.) But contextual dependency is a 
late concern in the philosophy of ideal languages. Formal lan-
guages used in mathematics and pure science do not need lin-
guistic resources like indexicals and demonstratives. So, very 
much like fictional charact ers, formal languages are artefacts 
created from the scratch. 
Regimentation is a kind of human intervention. There 
are degrees of regimentation. Languages used in mathemat-
ics, for instance, are totally regimented, and do not evolve 
over time. They have strict conditions of identity. If you add 
new operators or expand the vocabulary, the result is a new 
language, allowing new inferences. But the language used in 
judicial affairs, for instance, is a mixture of natural language 
and a lot of technical jargon. Different people, sometimes eas-
ily identified, at different moments, made contributions to a 
judicial tradition (from which other judicial traditions can 
borrow). The language of that tradition is something unique, 
expressing the rules and criteria guiding the decisions of the 
judiciary of one nation. Each tradition determines how to ap-
ply correctly the terms of its own language. In some tradition 
the intervention is massive. The Catholic Church is a good 
example of an institution mastering her own language, which 
is not anymore, to some degree, a natural language.  
Portuguese, French, English, Latin, are natural languages. 
But why do we call them “natural”? Sometimes we hear that 
Dante is the “father” of the Italian language, Camões, of the 
Portuguese, Shakesp eare, of English language; Molière of the 
French language and Goethe of German. Of course, nothing 
of that is true. These are just façons de parler. No identifying 
group, let alone a single author, could have created something 
like Portuguese. But no natural language would exist without 
the intentionality of personal users, and the use of language 
presupposes mental states, intentions, desires, beliefs, plans 
and needs. The arbitrariness of language would be, we are told, 
the proof that it is an artefact. A long tradition talks about the 
“imposition” of meanings to words, as an act depending on 
intelligence and will (Locke). After all, natural languages do 
not come from a natural process, and nature cannot, just by 
itself, produce a song or a language like Portuguese. But are 
natural languages really artefacts? The metaphor of language 
as an instrument suggests that it is. Let us call “intentional 
work,” a sustained and dedicated act ivity oriented toward the 
production of some good or artefacts. It seems clear that col-
lective intentional work is perfectly possible; we have example 
of that every day, for example, in the construction of a house. 
But a natural language is not like a house, not even like a boat. 
On that score, Putnam’s comparison between a language and 
a boat that requires a whole crew for the maneuvers is flawed. 
The collective intentional work of the crew is somehow uni-
fied by the captain’s orders; and the construction of a house   is 
guided by the blue print of an architect, while there is nothing 
like that for a natural language. There is no maestro conduct-
ing the evolution of natural languages. Philosophers writing 
in the great Encyclopedia suggest ed the idea of a metaphysics 
7 K. Twardowski, in On the Content and Object of Presentations, argues that the expression “painted landscape” can refer to the primary 
object (the real landscape which is the model of the painter), or the landscape we can see on the canvas (secondary object) through 
which the real landscape is referred to. In the ongoing case, there is no clear intentional object, primary or secondary. See Twardowski, 
1977, p. 16.
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of instinct and sentiment guiding unconsciously the formation 
and development of languages. This could be an intentional 
process, but only in a very diluted sense. Using Twardowski’s 
notions, in this case there is no presentation of the primary in-
tentional object, not even of the secondary intentional object 
(Twardowski, 1977, p. 16).7 We can trace back in some cases 
linguistic individual contributions to the persons who made 
them, but this is rarely possible. The idea to treat nations as 
collective agents looks a bit weird in that case. What kind of 
agent would be that? Nations can act as one, when they are 
at war, for instance, when a whole hierarchy of command is 
at work.  But the creation and evolution of language do not 
correspond to any collective intentional work. Natural lan-
guages are natural because there is no corresponding inten-
tional work, collective or individual. They have morpholog-
ical structures to welcome and host lexical innovations. But 
they are more alike readymade works of art than it seems at 
first sight. We are all born in linguistic communities, each one 
with a fully constituted language. But each sp eaker-hearer has 
the opportunity to contribute by adding something (coining 
a new expression, a neologism, introducing a new funny met-
aphor, etc.). What we call a “language” is abstract ed from the 
idiolects of the living sp eakers in a community.8  The knowl-
edge each one has of the language is always incomplete. Some 
people can sp end a whole time life without creating a new ex-
pression, a neologism or even a new metaphor. But most people 
do these things. We are like workers constructing a road of the 
type via romana, but so long that no one has ever seen its end. 
Each one put a few stones on the soil, but no one, absolutely 
no one, knows where it goes. Paradoxically, each worker does 
his part intentionally and individually, but without this indi-
vidual work, there wouldn’t be any language; however, there is 
no “conducting intentionality.” So, after all, we have some good 
reasons to call natural languages “natural.”  They developed an-
archically, randomly, through mixtures with other languages 
spoken by other people, invaders or conquered.  But the sen-
tences we use and create everyday are clearly artefacts.  
How do we Specify our 
Thoughts?
There are various theories of propositions elaborated by 
logicians and philosophers of language. We are told that prop-
ositions have different logical forms; that language, some-
times, masquerade their real logical form, and that they fulfill 
many different functions: they are the meanings of sentences, 
the bearers of truth value, the contents of utterances, and the 
objects of attitudes. I won’t discuss all these important asp ects. 
Rather, I would like to defend the idea that, when it 
comes to the pragmatics of natural languages, propositions are 
phenomenologically susp ect, and that sentences are enough 
for sp ecifying our thoughts. Thoughts are not grasp ed by a 
mysterious kind of intellectual intuition. We made them each 
time we have to sp ecify what we think, what we understand, 
or when we have to make explicit what we communicate. 
Thoughts are mental representations of their conditions of 
satisfact ion constructed by following the instructions (mean-
ings) acquired in a linguistic community. We acquire our 
linguistic dispositions in a community, and the community, 
most of the time, provides the stimuli for the manifest ations 
of these dispositions out of which the thoughts are composed. 
According to Soames, propositions are the result of an act 
of predication (Soames, 2010, p. 99). More precisely, a prop-
osition would be the type of an act of predication. That view 
of proposition, be it correct or not, looks like a good start, be-
cause propositions are things we make by using predicates, not 
something pre-existing and waiting to be grasp ed in a third 
realm. But sp ecifying is also an act and I believe one of the most 
important and not much discussed in the philosophy of lan-
guage. I take inspiration from Condillac, today a very neglected 
philosopher, but quite influential in the XVIIIth century. Con-
dillac’s idea is this: the analysis of thought is already made in 
language. I suggest a reinterpretation of Condillac’s idea. The 
content of words, that is, the manifest ation of dispositions asso-
ciated with a word, is used to identify, analyze and express parts 
of our mental representations.  In other words, the mastery of 
a language is what allow us to sp ecify what we think and un-
derstand.9 What happens in our mind is a quick succession of 
fleeting mental images, perceptions, proprioception and “qua-
si-perceptions”. All our sensorial experience is temporally or-
dered (Leclerc, 2017). In terms of act ivity and passivity – terms 
borrowed from Husserl’s phenomenology –, we can distinguish 
two levels in what has been called “stream of consciousness”, 
by James and Husserl. At the first level, that of sensorial ex-
periences as such, passivity prevails, but we can close our eyes, 
choose to look in a different direction, from a different angle, 
etc. At the second level, that of imagination and memory, ac-
tivity prevails; we can bend at will our stream of consciousness. 
A classic example: I have lost my keys; so, I try to go back in 
time up to the moment when I remember having them in my 
pocket; then I “go forward” remembering all the places where 
I have been since then. I am in control as much as I am when I 
move my eyes, my limbs or my tongue. Language is a way out 
of this stream, so to sp eak. It fixes what we think for ourselves 
and the members of our community and made it sharable. No 
need to say: it is indisp ensable for all human affairs, esp ecially 
for science and serious reasoning in complex matters. 
8 This is how I understand Davidson when he says: “I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything 
like what many philosophers and linguists have suppose.” (Davidson, 2005, p. 107). When we try a concrete approach to language, we 
do not find something abstract (which, consequently, cannot exist in space and time), but the idiolects of speakers-hearers, that is, a 
collection of different but converging repertoires of dispositions.
9 See Condillac (1947-1951). Essai sur l’origine des connoissances humaines (1746) and Traité des sensations (1754).
Artefacts: The Big Picture in Broad Terms
45Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):40-47, jan/apr 2021 
The view I would like to develop is that what we call 
“propositions,” most of the time, are expanded sentences used 
for sp ecifying thoughts expressed in ordinary language or 
in the regimented languages of sciences. If propositions are 
eternal abstract entities, they are not artefacts, we do not 
make them. On that score, I follow Quine, at least up to a 
certain point (Quine, 2013, p. 189), but I am an intention-
alist and I accept the first-person persp ective. “The present 
king of France is bald” does not have the form F(a) because 
it means the same as “There is at least one and no more than 
one king of France and he is bald”. Both sentences have the 
same truth-conditions; we get the second by expanding the 
first and by following a model, a guide. That guide is a sche-
matic mental representation of the truth-conditions. 
Most philosophers admit that native sp eakers-hear-
ers of different languages can express the same thought and 
grasp the same truth-conditions. People using different lan-
guages will sp ecify what they think by using a sentence of one 
of the public languages used in their community. If François 
asserts sincerely “Il pleut” and Hans asserts sincerely “Es reg-
net,” we agree that they both express the same thought, the 
same truth-conditions, something that is true or false exact-
ly in the same circumstances. What thought is that? Simply, 
the thought that it is raining or that the conditions for the 
truth of the sentence used in sp ecifying the thought (the one 
in French or German) are fulfilled. Specifying that thought 
is just using an English sentence (in that case, but it can be a 
sentence of any other language) in the scope of the operator 
“that.” This is how we proceed for sp ecifying our own thoughts 
or the thoughts of other people. 
But there is a difference between the way we understand 
our own thoughts and the way we understand those of the 
others. Burge calls the first “comprehension” and the second, 
“interpretation” (Burge, 1999, p. 236). The first is immedi-
ate, non-reflexive and non-inferential, but the second is just 
the opposite, reflexive and inferential. I doubt that the un-
derstanding of other people’s thoughts is always inferential. 
But there is clearly an asymmetry between comprehension 
and interpretation. Like Hume, unable to find a collection 
of impressions   within himself that could be called a “self,” 
when I understand my own thoughts, I do not find within 
myself or “before my mind” something like a proposition, a 
structured entity made out of concepts or Fregean senses. I 
have a readily representation of how the world is which is rel-
evant for my expectations. And when I hear someone saying 
something familiar, “The soup is on the table,” or something 
weird like “There is a blue elephant in front of your doorstep,” 
I construct a representation of how the world would be if the 
sentences were true (or how the world would be if my desire 
were satisfied or my intention fulfilled). And this construc-
tion, of course, is the result of a mental act ivity.
We have to learn languages. For most of us, that knowledge 
is far from complete; we absorb what we can, but our idiolect is 
enough to communicate in everyday situations.  We get used to 
words and their meanings through repetition and training. To 
each word we have learned corresponds a disposition realized 
in the brain. This seems to me to be the best explanation we 
have. The cognitive part of language, what we grasp when we 
understand words and sentences, the senses of the words, are 
manifest ations of these dispositions. Senses are instructions for 
constructing representations. Usually, these representations are 
schematic. The senses described by Austin’s descriptive con-
ventions are general in nature. What we understand is always 
more sp ecific, enriched by contextual factors.  
When I think ( judge, believe) that something is F, I don’t 
have a proposition “present to my mind”. Propositions, as inner 
objects “present to the mind” are phenomenologically susp ect. 
What is before the mind when I understand a sentence is a 
schematic representation that could be true in different, but 
similar situations. When I read in a fictional story that Sherlock 
does this or that, different readers will form different but sim-
ilar representations, each one following the semantic instruc-
tions of her/his own idiolect, each one filling the gaps from his/
her own experience. If that view is correct, the manifest ations 
of dispositions associated with words (nuclei of sense) are gen-
eral instructions helping us to construct such schematic repre-
sentations. The mental imagery may differ, but the situations 
are similar enough. Meanings are general in charact er, but they 
are precise enough to give sp ecific instructions for the construc-
tion of schematic mental representations. However, each one 
does it according to his/her own idiolect, that is, according to 
the dispositions acquired over time to which one’s meanings 
and concepts are associated.   
Spontaneous linguistic understanding presupposes a 
whole mental machinery, esp ecially when something import-
ant is at stake and we are really paying attention. Then we do 
worry about the truth of what we think and what we (or the 
others) say. When something important for us depends on 
the truth of our thoughts and utterances, our understanding 
does not stick to the standing meanings sp ecified by the de-
scriptive conventions. It considers a lot more (Leclerc, 2012). 
So why do we need propositions in the first place? Why 
not just sentences?  The demand, I believe, comes from log-
ic. In order to check our intuitions of validity, the sentence 
meaning of the premises and conclusion must be fixed and 
interpreted literally. But that can be done by expanded sen-
tences fixing the relevant contextual factors. When the lan-
guage is regimented and insensitive to contextual factors, as 
in pure science, you may call the premises and conclusion of a 
reasoning “propositions” if you like. 
When it comes to the pragmatics of natural languages, 
with context dependency everywhere, sentences are enough, 
because understanding comes first. Our mutual understanding 
always goes much beyond syntax and semantics. Our under-
standings are complex processes that contain more information 
than the sentence understood; we can expand the sentence we 
use to sp ecify our thoughts following the mental representa-
tions associated with our understanding. We use all sorts of 
knowledge (most of the time, an understanding of the whole 
situation, including the identity of the agents of the context, 
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their expectations, encyclopedic knowledge, etc.). If someone 
tells me “I am thirsty,” what do I understand? The truth-con-
ditions are the following: “I am thirsty” is true if and only if the 
person who says “I” is thirsty at the time of the utterance. But a 
full understanding of the sentence-used-in-context involves 
an identification of the sp eaker and a knowledge of the time 
of utterance. To get there, we just expand the sentence by add-
ing singular terms. But how do we do that? How do we know 
which terms are to be supplied? By following a rule, a model. 
Meanings are rules for the construction of mental represen-
tations (even when the representation is far from satisfactory 
or just a “vehicle” for an abstract thought). The model is the 
mental representation of the truth-conditions, something that 
contains more information than just the initial sentence. By ex-
panding the initial sentence, I sp ecify information contained in 
the representation. We only need sentences. 
Final Remarks
Things found in nature can serve our purposes. A cav-
ern can be a shelter for several families. Other sp ecies trans-
form their immediate environment to survive. Homo sapiens
does it on the largest possible scale. We colonized space, send 
artefacts on the Moon, on March, and beyond. But nothing 
of that would be remotely possible without sharable mental 
representations of truth-conditions (or conditions of satisfac-
tion).  What makes our representations and understandings 
sharable is precisely a repertoire of concepts and meanings 
associated with the words we have learned to use, that is, con-
vergent idiolects. This repertoire is a huge set of dispositions 
acquired over time, but the acquisition is not always a matter 
of being fully in control all the time. On the contrary, “we can 
know more than we can tell”, as Polanyi happily says, because 
we do not pay full attention to everything we learn (Polanyi, 
2009, p. 4).10 Think for one moment about all the words you 
have learned in your mother tongue, just by being there cir-
cled by loving people. No sp ecial training is necessary. The 
proportion of the words learned through explicit definitions 
or in a dictionary is in fact relatively small. In the same way, we 
acquired concepts inadvertently. Our repertoire of concepts 
is so large that it is not possible to scrutinize it exhaustively. 
In our researches and new experiences, we acquire new con-
cepts and knowledge, but in the basement of our repertoire of 
personal knowledge, there are things that hardly can be put 
in words. I believe that Francis Bacon and Descartes, in their 
philosophy of preconception (idols, bias or prejudices) had 
something important to say that goes exactly in that direction. 
But Descartes’ quest for an absolute commencement was an 
illusion. Many concepts and beliefs are acquired involuntary. 
Usually, racists become racist in racist families.  No one says: 
“I wanna be a racist!” Our different repertoires (of meanings, 
concepts, or knowledge) are acquired partly through explicit 
training and repetition, and partly involuntarily, just by be-
ing accustomed or by a kind of acclimation. They are, in part, 
passively inherited. In terms of “human intervention,” these 
repertoires are artefacts like natural languages and gardens. 
Each one has an idiolect, and a repertoire of concepts. The 
language we use, the knowledge we possess are inherited for a 
large part, but they contribute directly to our personal identity. 
They are for a large part inherited. They also can be changed 
and correct with hard work and good education. The arte-
facts of our everyday life somehow oblige us to acquire new 
skills and “shape our minds” (Malafouris, 2019, p. 5). The idea 
is not entirely new. Homo sapiens is the result of a long process 
of evolution. That process is natural, but the human beings as 
we find them today using sophisticated machines, languages 
and living circled by artefacts, are what human beings have 
made of human beings.11 We domesticated ourselves. 
Some Enlightenment philosophers expressed that point 
with simplicity: “The measure of reflection we have beyond 
our habits is what constitutes our reason. The habits are 
enough when the circumstances are such that one has just to 
repeat what we have learned” (Condillac, 1755, p. 363). Un-
fortunately, that measure of reflection is not always enough to 
resolve all the problems we face. More recently, van Fraassen 
says nicely that “rationality is but bridled irrationality” (Van 
Fraassen, 2002, p. 92). That measure of reflection beyond our 
habits and other dispositions, as the Greeks perceived clearly, 
is what make us sp ecial, what makes it possible to change, to 
correct what’s wrong, to fight for a better life for all.12
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